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Modern economies rely heavily on their infrastructure networks. These networks
face threats ranging from natural disasters to human attacks. As networks are per-
vasive, the investments needed to protect them are very large; this motivates the
study of targeted defense. What are the “key” nodes to defend to maximize func-
tionality of the network? What are the incentives of individual nodes to protect
themselves in a networked environment and how do these incentives correspond
to collective welfare?
We first provide a characterization of optimal attack and defense in terms of two
classical concepts in graph theory: separators and transversals. This characteriza-
tion permits a systematic study of the intensity of conflict (the resources spent
on attack and defense) and helps us identify a new class of networks—windmill
graphs—that minimize conflict.
We then study security choices by individual nodes. Our analysis identifies the
externalities and shows that the welfare costs of decentralized defense in networks
can be very large.
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1. Introduction
Our nation’s critical infrastructure is crucial to the functioning of the American econ-
omy. . . (It) is increasingly connected and interdependent and protecting it and enhancing
its resilience is an economic and national security imperative (Department of Homeland
Security 2012).
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Infrastructure networks—highways, aviation, shipping, pipelines, train systems, and
posts—are a vital part of the modern economy. These networks face a variety of threats
ranging from natural disasters to human attacks. The latter may take a violent form
(guerrilla attacks, attacks by an enemy country, and terrorism) or a nonviolent form (as
in political protest that blocks transport services).1 A network can be made robust to
such threats through additional investments in equipment and in personnel. As net-
works are pervasive, the investments needed could be very large; this motivates the
study of targeted defense. What are the “key” parts of the network that should be pro-
tected to ensure maximal functionality? As defense is often a choice made by individual
actors, we also wish to understand the relation between network structure and decen-
tralized incentives. This paper develops a model to study these questions.
Consider a given infrastructure network consisting of nodes and links. The defender
chooses to protect “nodes” of the network against damage/attacks; protecting a node is
costly. Protection includes investments in security personnel, in training, in equipment,
and in cybersecurity. These protection measures typically take time to implement and
so we focus on ex ante investments in protection. We suppose that a defended node is
immune to attack whereas an undefended node is eliminated by attack (along with all its
links). The initial network, the defense, and the attack together yield a set of surviving
nodes and links—the residual network. The defender chooses a defense strategy that
maximizes the value of the residual network, net of the costs of defense.
Our model covers two scenarios. The first is that of an intelligent adversary who
seeks to damage components and disrupt the flows in the network. The second is that
of a natural threat: facing such a threat, the defender focuses on the worst case scenario.
In both cases the defender looks for the “maximin” solution. For expositional simplicity,
we use the language of an intelligent adversary throughout. We study a game between a
defender and an adversary and analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
We consider network payoff functions in which the value to the defender of a net-
work is component additive, and the payoff from each component is increasing and
convex in the size of the component.2 The convexity of value in component size is key
to the appeal of connectivity in networks.
We begin with a study of optimal defense. Proposition 2 characterizes optimal de-
fense and attack. Optimal attack targets two types of nodes: those that fragment the
network into distinct components (the separators) and those that simply reduce the size
of components (the reducing attacks). As payoffs are convex in component size, separa-
tors are particularly attractive targets for attack (as their elimination disconnects com-
ponents). Anticipating this attack, optimal defense targets nodes that block the separa-
tors and reduce attacks. A set of nodes that block a collection of separators is referred to
1For an introduction to network based conflict, see Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) and Zhu and Levinson
(2011); for news coverage of the effects of natural disasters and human attacks on infrastructure networks,
see Eun (2010), Kliesen (1994), and Pandey (2011) and Luft (2005).
2This specification is consistent with Metcalfe’s law (network value is proportional to the square of the
number of nodes) and Reed’s law (network value is exponentially increasing in the number of nodes). It
is also in line with the large theoretical literature on network externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Farrell
and Saloner 1986) and network economics (Bala and Goyal 2000, Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). One way to
define network value is the number of pairs of nodes connected (directly or indirectly) in the network. This
is a special case of our value function.
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as a transversal. We prove that optimal defense either targets a minimal transversal or
protects all nodes. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate these concepts.3
This characterization result allows us to study the relation between networks and
conflict more closely. We find that the size of defense and attack are both nonmonotonic
in the cost of attack; even more surprisingly, the size of defense and the payoff of the
defender may fall with the addition of links in the network (Proposition 3).
We then turn to the intensity of conflict : this is the sum of expenditures of defense
and attack. For a given configuration of costs of defense and attack, we derive the min-
imal intensity of conflict and then describe the networks that sustain it (Proposition 4).
We then demonstrate that network architecture can create very large variations in the
intensity of conflict. A feature of minimal conflict is that there is a single active player.
We next discuss circumstances under which both players devote resources to conflict in
equilibrium.
An important insight of the analysis is the optimality of strategic exposure: the de-
fender may find it optimal to leave unprotected a key node (the elimination of which
disconnects the network) and instead to protect an alternative, larger, set of nodes. We
refer to this as the queen sacrifice. This leads us to identify a class of networks—windmill
graphs—that minimize conflict and are also attractive for the defender. Figure 7 presents
these networks.
In many situations, security decisions are made at the local level, e.g., individual
airports choose their own security checks. This motivates the study of decentralized se-
curity.4 Individual nodes care about surviving an attack and about being part of a large
connected network. Observe that to block a separator it is sufficient for one node in the
separator to protect itself. So, in the game among the nodes, defense choices within a
separator are strategic substitutes. But for the network to remain connected, all sepa-
rators must be blocked. Therefore a node will protect itself only if other separators are
being blocked: thus defense choices also exhibit strategic complementarity. Proposi-
tion 5 shows that decentralized security choices can be characterized in terms of sepa-
rators and transversals of the network. Finally, we demonstrate that a combination of
incentive and coordination issues may lead to very large costs of decentralization.
Our paper contributes to the economic study of networks. The research on net-
works has been concerned with the formation, structure, and functioning of social and
economic networks (Goyal 2007, Jackson 2008, and Vega-Redondo 2007). The prob-
lem of key players has traditionally been studied in terms of Bonacich centrality, be-
tweenness, eigenvectors, and degree centrality; see, e.g., Bala and Goyal (2000), Ballester
et al. (2006), Choi et al. (forthcomming), DeMarzo et al. (2003), Elliott and Golub (2013),
Galeotti et al. (2010), and Golub and Jackson (2010). Our paper suggests that for the
problem of attack and defense, the key players are nodes that lie in separators and
transversals. These nodes are typically distinct from nodes that maximize familiar no-
tions of centrality. Appendix B discusses this distinction in detail. Thus the principal
3Appendix C provides a detailed application of the concepts to well known families of networks (trees,
core–periphery, interlinked stars).
4For an early contribution on interdependent security, see Kunreuther and Heal (2003).
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contribution of our paper is to introduce two classical concepts from graph theory into
economics and show how they address a problem of practical importance.
Individual defense is a public good, and so this conceptual contribution is also rele-
vant for the study of games on networks more generally. Bramoullé and Kranton (2007)
draw attention to maximal independent sets. By contrast, our work brings out the role of
minimal transversal of the separators. These sets are generally different from maximal
independent sets.5
Our paper also contributes to the literature on network defense; see, e.g., Bier et al.
(2007), Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008), Acemoglu et al. (2013), Dziubin´ski and Goyal
(2013), Goyal and Vigier (2014), Clark and Konrad (2007), and Kovenock and Roberson
(2012). To the best of our knowledge, our results on the role of separators and transver-
sals in network conflict are novel, relative to the existing body of work. In particular, we
note that the earlier work by Dziubin´ski and Goyal (2013) and Goyal and Vigier (2014)
focuses on optimal design and defense. In these papers, the optimal network takes on
a very simple form—it is a star—and so the optimal defense takes on a correspondingly
simple structure: protect the central hub node. By contrast, in the present paper the
network is exogenous and arbitrary: this is a much broader problem and requires new
conceptual tools.
We note that the problem of network defense has traditionally been studied in op-
erations research, electrical engineering, and computer science; see, e.g., Alpcan and
Bas¸ar (2011), Aspnes et al. (2006), Smith (2008), and Grötschel et al. (1995). In an early
paper, Cunningham (1985) looks at the problem of network design and defense with
conflict on links. Relative to this literature, the novelty of our paper lies in the study of
intensity of conflict and the externalities that arise in decentralized defense.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of defense
and attack. Section 3 introduces the main concepts and provides a characterization of
equilibrium defense and attack. It also contains the study of comparative statics, ac-
tive conflict, and conflict intensity. Section 4 takes up the case of decentralized defense.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are presented in Appendix A. Appendix B analyzes the
relation between key nodes to attack and defend and other notions of centrality. Ap-
pendix C illustrates the notions of separators and transversals in well known families of
networks such as core–periphery networks, trees, interlinked stars, and bipartite graphs.
In Appendix D, we discuss the role of sequentiality of moves and perfect defense in the
results obtained in the paper.
2. The model
We start with a given network and consider a two-player sequential move game with
a defender and an adversary. In the first stage, the defender chooses an allocation of
defense resources. In the second stage, given a defended network, the adversary chooses
the nodes to attack. Successfully attacked nodes (and their links) are removed from the
5For example, in a core–periphery network, all the core nodes are essential separators, while the maximal
independent set can include at most one core node and must include peripheral nodes. See Appendix C for
details on this.
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network, yielding a residual network. The goal of the defender is to maximize the value
of the residual network, while the goal of the adversary is to minimize this value.6
Let N = {1     n}, with n≥ 3, be a finite set of nodes. A link is a two element subset
of N . The set of all possible links over P ⊆ N is gP = {ij : i j ∈ P i = j} (where ij is an
abbreviation for {i j}). A network is a set of links. Given the set of nodes P ⊆N , G(P) =
2g
P
is the set of all networks over P . The set G =⋃P⊆N G(P) is the set of all networks that
can be formed over any subset of nodes from N . Every network g ∈ G has a value (g),
associated with it:  : G →R is called a value function.
The set of nodes X ⊆ N chosen by the adversary is called an attack. The set X = ∅
is called the empty attack. A defense is a set of nodes  ⊆ N ; node i ∈ N is defended
under  if and only if i ∈ . We assume that the defense is perfect: a protected node
cannot be removed by an attack, while any attacked unprotected node is removed with
certainty. Given defense  and attack X , set Y = X \  will be removed from the net-
work. Removing a set of nodes Y ⊆N from a network creates a residual network g−Y =
{ij ∈ g : i j ∈N \Y }.
Defense resources are costly: the cost of defending a node is cD > 0. Given network g,
the defender’s payoff from strategy  ⊆ N , when faced with the adversary’s strategy
X ⊆N , is
D(X;g cD)=(g− (X \))− cD||
Attack resources are costly: the cost of attacking a node is given by cA > 0. Given
defended network (g), the payoff to the adversary from strategy X ⊆N is
A(X;g cA)= −(g− (X \))− cA|X| (1)
We study the (subgame perfect) equilibria of this game.
Two nodes i and j are connected in network g if there is a sequence of nodes
i0     im such that i = i0, j = im, and for all 0 < k ≤ m, ik−1ik ∈ g. A component of net-
work g is a maximal and nonempty set of nodes C ⊆N such that any two distinct nodes
i j ∈ C are connected in g. The set of components of g is denoted by C(g).
We assume that  is component additive. Given network g,
(g)=
∑
C∈C(g)
f (|C|)
where f satisfies the following assumption:
Assumption 1. We have that f : R+ → R+ is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and
f (0)= 0.
6The sequential move game formulation appears to be appropriate for the large scale and time con-
suming protection investments discussed in the Introduction. This two-stage model with observability of
first-stage actions is consistent with the approach in the large literature on security and networks; see, e.g.,
Tambe (2012) and Alpcan and Bas¸ar (2011).
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Remarks on the model
We have assumed sequential moves; this is mainly for exposition. It is possible to show
that our main results on characterization of conflict in terms of certain properties of the
graph carries over with simultaneous moves. Perfect defense is a more substantial as-
sumption. Smoother models of conflict such as the Tullock contest function would lead
to modifications in parts of the main characterization results below. Appendix D dis-
cusses these points in greater detail. Finally, we have assumed that payoffs depend only
on the sizes of the networks (or their components): so we abstract from other topologi-
cal details of the network. This simplification allows us to make progress and should be
seen as a first step in the study of network defense.
Since the game is finite and sequential, standard results guarantee the existence of
(subgame perfect) equilibria. These equilibria are usually not unique, but generically,
equilibrium outcomes are equivalent with respect to player’s payoffs, sizes of defense
and attack, and the value of residual network. This is the content of the following result.
Proposition 1. For any network g and costs cD and cA, there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium. For generic values of cA and cD and generic f , the equilibrium attack and
defense size and the payoffs of the players are unique.
3. The analysis
This section develops our main results for the two-person game between the defender
and the adversary. Optimal attack focuses on sets of nodes that fragment the network
(the separators), while optimal defense targets sets of nodes that block these separators
(the transversals). The interest then moves on to the relation between network architec-
ture and the intensity of conflict (the sum of resources allocated to attack and defense)
and the prospects of active conflict (when the adversary eliminates some nodes while
the defender protects others).
We begin with a study of a simple example that helps illustrate a number of interest-
ing phenomena.
Example 1 (Defense and attack on the star). Consider the star network with n = 4 and
{a} as the central node (as in Figure 1). The value function is f (x)= x2.
As is standard, we solve the game by working backward. For every defended net-
work (g) we characterize the optimal response of the adversary. We then compare the
payoffs to the defender from different profiles, (g), and compute the optimal defense
strategy. Equilibrium outcomes are summarized in Figure 2.
A number of points are worth noting.
(i) Observe that removing node a disconnects the network; this node is a separator.
Moreover, there is a threshold level of cost of attack such that the adversary either
attacks a or does not attack at all when cA > 7. Protecting this node is also central
to network defense.
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Figure 1. Star network (n= 4).
Figure 2. Equilibrium outcomes: star network (n= 4) and f (x)= x2.
(ii) The intensity of conflict exhibits rich patterns: when the cost of attack is very
large there is no threat to the network and no need for defense. If the cost of
attack is small, the intensity of conflict hinges on the level of defense costs. When
they are low, all nodes are protected and there is no attack (the costs of conflict
are ncD); if they are high, then there is no defense but all nodes are eliminated
(the costs of conflict are ncA). For intermediate cost of attack and defense, both
defense and attack are seen in equilibrium.
(iii) The size of defense may be nonmonotonic in the cost of attack. Fix the cost of
defense at cD = 35. At a low cost of attack (cA < 1) the defender protects all nodes,
in the range cA ∈ (15) he protects 0 nodes, in the range cA ∈ (513) he protects
{a}, and then in the range cA > 13, he stops all protection activity. Similarly, the
size of the attack strategy may be nonmonotonic in the cost of attack. ♦
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Figure 3. Essential separators.
The starting point of the general analysis is the nature of optimal attack. Given the
convexity in the value function of networks, disconnecting a network is especially dam-
aging. A set X ⊆ N is a separator if |C(g)| < |C(g − X)|. In other words, a separator is
a set of nodes the removal of which strictly increases the number of components in the
network. A network will normally possess multiple separators and the adversary should
target the most effective ones. A separator S ⊆N is essential for network g ∈ G(N), if for
every separator S′  S, |C(g − S)| > |C(g − S′)|, i.e., a strict subset of eliminated nodes
would lead to a strictly smaller number of components. The set of all essential sepa-
rators of a network g is denoted by E(g). Figure 3 illustrates essential separators in an
example.
The second element is the level of costs. As illustrated by Example 1, the network
defense problem can be divided into two parts, depending on the cost of attack. Given
x ∈ N, f(x) = f (x + 1) − f (x) is the marginal increase in the value of a component of
size x when a single node is added to it. Under Assumption 1, f(x) is strictly increasing.
It is useful to separate two levels of costs: one, high costs with cA > f(n− 1), and two,
low costs with cA <f(n− 1).
We start with the case of high cost as it brings out some of the main general insights
in a straightforward way. Facing a high cost, the adversary must disconnect the net-
work, i.e., choose a separator or not attack the network at all. Clearly, the adversary
would never use an essential separator that yields a lower payoff than the empty attack.
Given the cost of attack cA and network g, the set of individually rational separators is
E(g cA)= {X ∈ E(g) : (g)−(g−X)≥ cA|X|}.
When the cost of attack is low, it may be profitable for the adversary to use attacks
that merely remove nodes from the network, without disconnecting it. A set R ⊆ N is a
reducing attack for a network g if there is no X ⊆R such that X is a separator for g. The
set of all reducing attacks for a given network g is denoted by R(g).
The following lemma characterizes all the possible attacks of the adversary in terms
of essential separators and reducing attacks. In addition, it provides a characterization
of the attacks that are best responses in the adversary’s subgame.
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Lemma 1. Fix a connected network g. Let  ⊆ N be a defense selected by the defender in
the first stage. Any attack X ⊆N can be decomposed into two disjoint sets: a set E and a
reminder set R such that the following statements hold:
(i) The set E is either empty or E ∈ E(g).
(ii) The set R is a reducing attack for g−E.
Moreover, ifX is a best response to , then E is either empty or E ∈ E(g cA).
The first part of the lemma says that any attack of the adversary can be seen as con-
sisting of two phases. In one of the phases the adversary fragments the network by re-
moving a minimal set of nodes needed to obtain the desired components after the at-
tack. This set is an essential separator of the network. In the other phase the adversary
reduces the size of the components (but without disconnecting any of them). Thus the
notion of essential separator captures exactly the attacks that serve the function of frag-
menting the network. The characterization of attacks obtained in the first part of the
lemma is useful in understanding the best responses of the adversary. If X is a best re-
sponse to some strategy of the defender, then applying an essential separator phase of
X after the reducing attack phase is applied must be worthwhile. But then, by convex-
ity of f , it must be worthwhile even more to apply the essential separator phase before
the reducing attack phase. Therefore the essential separator phase must be individually
rational.
We now turn to the equilibrium strategies of the defender. Again, it is instruc-
tive to start with the setting where the cost of attack is high. An optimal strategy of
the defender should block a subset of individually rational essential separators in the
most economical way. Given a family of sets of nodes, H, and a set of nodes, M ,
D(MH)= {X ∈H : X∩M =∅} are the sets in H that are blocked (or covered) by M . The
set M is called a transversal of H if D(MH) = H. The set of all transversals of H is de-
noted by T (H). Elements of T (H) that are minimal with respect to inclusion are called
minimal transversals of H. Elements of T (H) with the smallest size are called minimum
transversals of H. Let τ(H) denote the transversal number of H, i.e., the size of a mini-
mum transversal of H. Given a family of sets F ⊆H, the set M is called a transversal of
F in H if D(MH)= F . The set of all transversals of F in H is denoted by T (F |H). Ele-
ments of T (F |H) with the smallest size are called minimum transversals of F in H. Let
τ(F |H) denote the transversal number of F in H, i.e., the size of a minimum transversal
of F in H. Notice that τ(F |H) ≥ τ(F). In other words, avoiding blocking some of the
potential attacks of the adversary, and hence strategically exposing some parts of the
network, may entail an additional cost. As we show below, strategic exposure may be a
part of a rational defense strategy.
Let g be the network in Figure 3. Let H = E(g) = {{a} {ab} {a c}} be the set of all
essential separators of g and let F = {{ab} {a c}} be its subset. Figure 4 illustrates the
unique minimum (and, at the same time, minimal) transversal of H, {a}. The unique
minimum transversal of F in H is {b c}. Thus the most economic way to block exactly
the separators from F out of all the separators from H is by blocking nodes b and c.
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Figure 4. Minimum transversal, {a}, of essential separators {{a} {ab} {a c}}.
We provide more examples and a discussion of essential separators and their transver-
sals in some well known families of networks (trees, core–periphery, interlinked stars) in
Appendix C.
We are now ready to state our first main result on optimal defense and attack.
Proposition 2. Consider a connected network g ∈ G(N). Let (∗X∗) be an equilib-
rium.
(i) If cA <f(n− 1), then the following statements hold:
• The variable ∗ =N or ∗ is a minimal transversal of D(∗E(g cA)).
• We have X∗()= E ∪R, where E ∈ E(g cA) and R ∈R(g −E), with X∗() ∩
=∅.
(ii) If cA >f(n− 1), then the following statements hold:
• Wehave |∗| ≤ τ(E(g cA)) and∗ is aminimum transversal ofD(∗E(g cA))
in E(g cA).
• We have X∗()= ∅ if  ∈ T (E(g cA)); X∗() ∈ E(g cA) with X∗() ∩ = ∅,
otherwise.
The proposition brings out the economic trade-offs in the network conflict. Essen-
tial separators—that are effective at fragmenting the network—are key to optimal at-
tack and economical transversals that block these separators are key to optimal defense.
Moreover, if the defender wishes to go beyond blocking the separator and protect nodes
that merely expand the size of a component, then, due to convex character of network
value function, it is optimal for him to protect all the nodes in the network.
More formally, optimal defense is defined in terms of the minimal transversal of
the appropriate set of essential separators or defense must cover all nodes. If the cost
of attack is such that elimination of single nodes is not worthwhile, optimal attack is
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bounded from above by the set of essential separators of the network. In this case, opti-
mal defense can never exceed the size of the minimum transversal of the set of individ-
ually rational essential separators. If, alternatively, the cost of attack justifies the elim-
ination of single nodes, optimal attack is constituted of nodes that comprise reducing
attacks and essential separators. In this case, an interesting feature of optimal defense is
that it may be larger than the smallest possible transversal (even when it does not cover
all the nodes).
We now briefly describe the arguments underlying the proof. By Lemma 1, we know
that any attack may be decomposed into two disjoint parts that comprise an essential
separator and a reducing attack.
In the range of costs covered by part (ii), the adversary will not use reducing at-
tacks. So, an optimal attack must be either empty or an individually rational essen-
tial separator. Next consider the optimal defense strategy, ∗. Clearly, ∗ cannot be
larger than the size of the minimum transversal of E(g cA), as that would be wasteful for
the defender. If |∗| = τ(E(g cA)), then ∗ must be a minimum transversal of E(g cA);
choosing a defense other than a minimum transversal would simply lower payoffs. If
|∗|< τ(E(g cA)), then ∗ is a minimum transversal of D(∗E(g cA)) in E(g cA).
We turn next to part (i) of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds by showing that a de-
fense that exceeds a minimal transversal (of covered essential separators) must include
some node that is being protected purely to prevent it from removal. Hence the role of
such a defense is to ensure the size of the component. This must mean that, in the ab-
sence of defense, the node would be eliminated in the subsequent optimal attack. We
then exploit the convexity of f and the linearity of costs of defense and attack to estab-
lish that the adversary must find it optimal to eliminate all other unprotected nodes in
the surviving component. Extrapolating from this, we establish that this must apply to
all essential separators and then, by convexity, to single nodes in those components as
well. In other words, if the defender finds it optimal to go beyond a minimal transversal
of blocked essential separators, then he must protect all nodes.
We now consider the general comparative statics with respect to the costs and the
network. It is worth noting some patterns in Example 1 above. Figure 2 suggests that
defense size is falling in defense costs and is nonmonotonic in attack costs. The attack
size is nonmonotonic in both attack cost and defense cost. These patterns are true more
generally. They have payoff implications. The following result summarizes our analysis.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium comparative statics are as follows.
(i) The size of defense and the defender’s payoff are both decreasing in the cost of de-
fense. The defender’s payoff increases in the cost of attack. However, depending on
the costs and the network, the size of defense may increase or decrease when the
cost of attack increases.
(ii) Depending on the costs and the network, the size of attack and adversary’s payoff
may increase or decrease when the cost of attack increases. The adversary’s payoff
increases in the cost of defense. However, depending on the costs and the network,
the size of attack may increase or decrease when the cost of defense increases.
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Figure 5. Network where a rise in the cost of defense reduces the size of attack.
(iii) Depending on the costs and the network, adding linksmay increase or decrease the
size of the optimal defense as well as the defender’s payoff.
We note that the effect of defense cost on the size of attack may be nonmonotonic.
This is because with a higher cost of defense, the defender may uncover some essential
separators to which the adversary could switch. Their size might be smaller or larger
than the size of separators chosen by the adversary under the lower cost of defense. As
an example, consider the network g in Figure 5 and suppose that f (x)= x2, cA ∈ (3154),
and cD ∈ (108121). Under these parameters, in every equilibrium the defender defends
node a and the adversary responds with essential separator {b c}. When the cost of
defense rises to 122, equilibrium defense of the defender is ∅ to which the adversary
responds with essential separator {a}. Alternatively, Example 1 illustrates that the size
of attack might rise when the cost of defense is rising (cf. the case of cA ∈ (713) in Fig-
ure 2). Despite this nonmonotonic behavior of equilibrium attack size, the payoff to the
adversary increases when the cost of defense rises. A similar observation also holds for
the effect of attack cost on defense size and on payoffs.
An increase in attack cost has nonmonotonic effects on attack size and the adver-
sary’s payoff. This is illustrated by Example 1, e.g., when the cost of defense is in the
range (3254). The reason for these nonmonotonicities is as follows. When the cost of
attack rises, some of the attacks stop being individually rational. This creates an oppor-
tunity for the defender to reduce defense, possibly at the expense of some value of the
network. This, in turn, allows the adversary to execute attacks that were blocked when
the cost of attack was lower. In the example, when cA ∈ (01), it is individually ratio-
nal for the adversary to remove any unprotected node. Therefore, with cD ∈ (3254), the
defender defends all the nodes. When cA ∈ (15), it is not individually rational for the ad-
versary to remove single unprotected nodes. With the costs of defense in (3254), the
defender prefers to leave the network undefended and loose the central node, saving on
the cost of defense and loosing some value of the network. Such an attack is better for
the adversary than not removing any node. The size of attack rises from 0 to 1 and the
payoff of the adversary rises from −16 to −3 − cA ∈ (−9−4). When cA > 7, the size of
attack falls back to 0 and the payoff to the adversary falls back to −16.
Finally, consider the effects of adding links. A first conjecture would be that adding
links should always be good for the defender, as it creates more routes for connection
and this should make the network easier to defend. The next example shows that this
intuition is false: a denser network may induce a larger optimal defense with lower de-
fender payoffs!
Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) How do you defend a network? 343
Figure 6. Example 2. (a) Original network. (b) Network with added link.
Example 2 (Adding links may increase defense size and lower defender payoffs). We
consider the network given in Figure 6. Suppose that payoff from a component of size x
is f (x)= x2.
Assume the cost of attack cA ∈ (2331) and the cost of defense cD ∈ (4385). The
unique equilibrium outcome is ∗ = {c}, X∗ = {d}. The equilibrium payoff to the de-
fender is 101− cD.
Now consider a network g′ = g ∪ {ef }, with a link added between the nodes e and f .
With this additional link, the separator {d} is replaced by separator {de}. Suppose that
the cost of defense is cD ∈ (4362). Observe that with defense ∗ = {c}, there exists an at-
tack {de} that is optimal for the adversary and yields only 82− cD to the defender. Thus
the addition of a link, and retaining the same defense, may actually lower the defender’s
payoffs.
In the new network g′, the unique equilibrium outcome is ∗ = {de} and X∗ = ∅.
The equilibrium payoff to the defender is 144− 2cD < 101− cD. So, the optimal defense
size increases and the defender’s payoff falls as the network becomes denser.
Alternatively, it is clear that as we keep adding links and arrive at the complete net-
work, the optimal attack is empty (as cA > 23) and so optimal defense is also the empty
set. The defender’s payoff is 144, which is the maximal attainable. Thus the effects of
adding links are nonmonotonic. ♦
This nonmonotonicity is not an artefact of the specifics of the network and the costs
of attack and defense. It reflects a general feature of conflict in networks. To see this
consider the case of the complete network. The first thought would be that a network
that contains the most connections is the hardest to disrupt and always leads to the best
outcomes for the defender. This is not true. The following example clarifies this point.
Example 3 (Complete network vs. core–periphery network). Suppose that n is large and
that the cost of attack satisfies
f (n− 2)− f (n− 3) < cA < f(n− 1)− f (n− 2)
With this cost of attack, the adversary removes two nodes from the complete network
over n nodes, one node from the complete network containing n − 1 nodes, and does
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not remove any nodes from the complete network containing n−2 or less nodes. Finally,
suppose that the cost of defense satisfies
f (n)− f (n− 2)− f (1)
n
< cD <
f(n)− f (n− 2)
n

With this cost of defense the defender protects all the nodes in a complete network with
n nodes, because f (n) − ncD > f(n − 2) (and we know that in a complete network the
defender either protects all or no nodes, in equilibrium).
Now consider a network with n− 1 nodes in a clique with one node linked to a sin-
gle element of the core (let us call it i). This is a type of core–periphery network. If
such a network is not protected, the adversary will remove node i only, disconnect-
ing the network into a clique of size n − 2 and a single isolated node. Now, we know
that the defender is either inactive, protects i, or protects all the nodes in equilibrium.
With the above cost of defense, the defender is inactive. First, note that f (n) − ncD <
f(n− 2)+ f (1), so protecting everything is worse than being inactive. It can be checked
that protecting i is worse, because in response the adversary would remove two nodes
from the core of the network.
Thus in the core–periphery network the equilibrium payoff to the defender is
f (n− 2)+ f (1) > f(n)− ncD
So it is better than the complete network. ♦
This example illustrates the attractiveness of the queen sacrifice strategy: it is better
to leave i unprotected because there is greater loss in value if it is protected! The idea
of queen sacrifice and the suboptimality of the complete network will resurface in other
contexts below.
3.1 Networks and conflict
This section examines the relation between the network architecture and the nature of
conflict more closely. We define the intensity of conflict as the sum of expenditures of
defense and attack. Our analysis shows that for given costs of conflict, differences in
network structure can lead to very large differences in conflict.
Proposition 1 tells us that the size of equilibrium attack and defense are generically
unique. We start by defining the minimum intensity of conflict for given costs of attack
and defense. Define minimal costs of conflict for given costs and f as
CC(cA cD f )= min
g∈G(N)
cD|∗(g cA cD f )| + cA|X∗(g cA cD f )|
Example 1 illustrates some of the forces at work. Observe that when the cost of attack
is very large, cA > 13= f (n)− (n− 1)f (1), no attack is profitable, and, anticipating this,
the defender abstains from defense. The intensity of conflict is 0. This lack of conflict
for large costs of attack is independent of the architecture of the network.
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Figure 7. Windmill graphs (hmn ): n= 13, m= 643.
Turning to the lower cost of attack, an inspection of Figure 1 in Example 1 tells us that
the intensity of conflict also depends on the cost of defense. It will be useful to define a
special class of networks, windmill graphs. These graphs are denoted by hmn , where n≥ 2
and m ∈ {1     n − 1}. There is one critical node that, when removed, disconnects the
network. The remaining nodes are partitioned into cliques of size m and, possibly, one
clique of smaller size (this implies that there are (n− 1)/m such cliques). Every mem-
ber of a clique is connected to the critical node. We now define a key cost threshold for
defense that equates the payoff from full defense with the payoff from an unprotected
hmn network:
c(mn)= f (n)−
⌊
n−1
m
⌋
f (m)− f ((n− 1) mod m)
n

Figure 7 illustrates windmill graphs.
We are now ready to provide a general characterization of minimal conflict levels.
Proposition 4. (i) If cA > f(n)− (n− 1)f (1), then CC(cA cD f )= 0. It is attained on
any connected network.
(ii) If cA ∈ (f (n− 1) f (n)− (n− 1)f (1)), then CC(cA cD f )= 0. It is attained on any
connected network g with E(g cA)= 0.
(iii) If cA ∈ (f (m− 1)f (m)) withm ∈ {1     n− 1}, one of the following statements
holds:
(iv) If cD > c(mn), then CC(cA cD f ) = cA. It is attained on a windmill net-
work, hmn .
(v) If cD < c(mn) with m ∈ {1     n − 1}, then CC(cA cD f ) = ncD. It is at-
tained on any connected network.
In case (ii), when the cost of attack is high, cA >f(n− 1), the minimal costs of con-
flict are 0, as it is not profitable for the adversary to attack any network with E(g cA)=∅.
Such networks include the complete network, as well as networks that are robust to node
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removal in the sense that they require a large number of nodes to be removed to get dis-
connected. More generally, for any integer t ≥ 1, a network is t-connected if it can be
disconnected by removing t nodes and cannot be disconnected by removing less than t
nodes. Any t-connected network with t ≥ (f (n)− nf(1)/(cA − f (1)) has empty E(g cA).
Menger (1927) provides a characterization of such networks: a network is at least t-
connected if and only if any two nodes that are not neighbors are connected through
at least t node independent paths.7 Thus such networks have many redundant connec-
tions between nodes.
The last case, with lower attack costs cA < f(n − 1), is much richer. Suppose that
cA ∈ (f (m − 1)f (m)), where m ∈ {1     n − 1}. Now it is profitable to the adversary
to attack any undefended node in a component of size greater than m. Hence, the lower
bound on costs of conflict is min(cA ncD). If the cost of defense is sufficiently low, cD <
c(mn), then complete defense is better than any other defense and the minimal costs of
conflict are ncD. If cD > c(mn), then complete defense has higher costs as compared to
the outcome with no defense and one attacked node. This leads to total costs of conflict
of cA. To sustain an equilibrium with such costs of conflict, we need a network that has a
separator of size 1 and that all components in the residual network have size at most m.
The windmill graph possesses exactly this characteristic. This motivates the windmill
network: for m ∈ {1     n − 2}, the windmill network hmn has such an equilibrium and
yields the minimal costs of conflict, cA.
We now turn to the role of networks in shaping the intensity of conflict. Proposition 4
tells us that network architecture matters only if the costs are as in cases (ii) or (iii).
Consider case (ii). Proposition 4 tells us that CC(cA cD f ) = 0 in this range. To see
the impact of network architecture, consider a star network. If cD < f(n)− (n− 1)f (1),
then in equilibrium the defender protects the center of the star and the costs of con-
flict are cD. Alternatively, if cD > f(n) − (n − 1)f (1), then in equilibrium the defender
chooses the empty defense, the adversary attacks the center of the star, and the costs
of conflict are cA. So, when the costs of attack and defense reach their upper bound,
the difference in the costs of conflict between the star network and the minimal attain-
able is f (n) − (n − 1)f (1). It is easy to see that this can grow without bound as n gets
large.
Next consider case (iii), with m ∈ {1     n − 2}. Proposition 4 tells us that the min-
imum conflict, attained on network hmn (for example) is cA. Suppose cD ∈ (c(mn)
(f (n)− f (m))/n) and consider a complete network. The unique equilibrium outcome is
full protection and so the costs of conflict are ncD. When the cost of defense reaches its
upper bound and the cost of attack reaches its lower bound, the difference in costs be-
tween this minimum and the complete network reaches f (n)+ f (m−1)−2f (m), which
is maximal, f (n)− 2f (1), for m= 1. Again, the network architecture can have very large
effects on the intensity of conflict.
Active conflict In Proposition 4, minimal conflict is associated with a single active
player. An inspection of Figure 2, in Example 1 above, shows us that both players can
7Two paths are node independent if the only nodes they have in common are the starting and the ending
nodes.
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be active in equilibrium. This motivates the study of circumstances under which we
should expect to see active conflict. Example 1 draws attention to the role of costs: nei-
ther the attack nor the defense costs can be too high. Here we briefly discuss the role of
the network architecture and the network value function.
We start with an observation that draws upon Proposition 2: for active conflict to
arise there must exist an individually rational essential separator. If such a separator
does not exist, then convexity of function f together with linearity of costs implies that
either none or all nodes are defended. In particular, if g is a complete network, then for
all costs and all functions f (satisfying our assumptions), there is no equilibrium with
active conflict.
Are there any other (connected) networks with the same property as complete net-
works? If the marginal value of f is growing sufficiently fast, then no active conflict is
possible. Let f satisfy the property, for x≥ 0,
f(x) > xf(x) (2)
where f(x)= f (x+ 1)− f (x).
The property is satisfied by functions f (x)= (x+1)!−1 and (x+1)x−1, for example.
Marginal value in these functions grows so rapidly that adding a single node to a com-
ponent of size m increases its value more than m times. In effect, the returns from pro-
tecting m< n nodes are smaller than average returns from protecting additional m− n
nodes. Thus if the defender prefers protecting the first m nodes to no protection, he is
even more willing to protect the whole network. Formally, let
∗(m;g cA)= max
⊆N||≤m
min
X∈BR(;gcA)
(g−X() \)
be a function that gives the maximum value of the residual network that can be attained
from network g when up to m units of defense are used and the cost of attack is cA
(BR(;g cA) denotes the set of best responses of the adversary to , given g and cA).
Suppose that there is an equilibrium, (∗X∗), featuring active conflict. Let |∗| = m,
Since there is active conflict, so 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1 and |X∗(∗)| ≥ 1. Since ∗ is better than
∅, so cD ≤ (∗(m;g cA) − ∗(0;g cA))/m ≤ f (n − 1). Alternatively, since ∗ is better
than N , so cD ≥ (f (n) − ∗(m;g cA))/(n − m) ≥ (f (n) − f (n − 1))/(n − 1). Combining
both the inequalities we get f (n)≤ nf(n− 1), which contradicts (2).
4. Decentralized defense
In many applications, security decisions are made at the individual node level. This sec-
tion studies decentralized security choices in a network that is under attack. We begin
by showing that the equilibrium choices of the nodes and the adversary can be char-
acterized in terms of transversals and separators of the underlying network. We then
show that the welfare gap between decentralized equilibrium and first best outcomes
is unbounded: interestingly, individual choice may lead to too little and to too much
protection, relative to the choice of a single (centralized) defender.
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We consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, each of the nodes in the network
decides whether to protect itself or to stay unprotected. These choices are observed by
the adversary who then chooses the nodes to attack.
Let N = {12     n}, where n ≥ 3 is the set of players, and let Si = {01} denote the
strategy set of node i ∈N . Here si = 1 means that the node chooses to defend itself and
si = 0 refers to the case of no defense. These choices are made simultaneously. There is a
one-to-one correspondence between a strategy profile of the nodes, s ∈ {01}N , and the
resulting set of defended nodes ⊆N . So we will use  to refer to the strategy profile of
the nodes in the first stage.
In the second stage the adversary observes the defended network (g) and chooses
an attack X ⊆N , which leads to a residual network g− (X \). The payoff to the adver-
sary remains as in the case of the centralized defense and is defined in (1). The payoff
to a node depends on whether the node is removed by the attack. A removed node re-
ceives payoff 0. Each of the surviving nodes receives an equal share of the value of its
component in the residual network,
i(X;g cD)=
{
0 if i ∈X \
f(|C(i)|)
|C(i)| − sicD otherwise
where C(i) is the component in the residual network g− (X \) that contains i.
This completes the description of the decentralized defense game. We study the
subgame perfect equilibria of this game, restricting attention to those without active
conflict.
Let us solve the game starting from the second stage. As in the two-player game, the
adversary chooses either the empty attack or an attack thatb is a combination of an es-
sential separator and a reducing attack. If the cost of attack is low and there is no active
conflict, then either the adversary removes all the nodes or all nodes are protected. In
any other outcome the adversary must remove at least one node. If the cost of attack is
high and there is no active conflict, then either none of the nodes protects or, anticipat-
ing the strategy of the adversary, the nodes choose a defense configuration that blocks
all the individually rational essential separators. Therefore, in equilibrium, they must
choose a minimal transversal of E(g cA). We build on these observations to provide
the following characterization of equilibria with no active conflict in the decentralized
defense game.8
Proposition 5. Consider a connected network g ∈ G(N). Let ∗ be the equilibrium de-
fense.
(i) If cD > f(n)/n, then ∗ =∅ is the unique equilibrium defense.
8We concentrate on equilibria with no active conflict, because, on one hand, it allows for providing a
clean characterization and, on the other hand, it provides a sufficiently rich platform for discussing the
sources of inefficiencies when defense decisions are decentralized. All other equilibria in decentralized
defense game could be characterized in the same spirit as the characterization provided in Proposition 2
for the centralized defense game.
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(ii) If cD ≤ f (n)/n, one of the following statements holds.
(a) If cA < f(n)− f (n− 1), then ∗ =N is an equilibrium defense.
(b) If cA > f(n)− f (n− 1), then any minimal transversal of E(g cA) is an equilib-
rium defense.
The equilibrium strategy of the adversary is as in Proposition 2.
We now turn to discussing inefficiencies that may arise due to decentralized pro-
tection, as well as their sources. We compare the aggregate welfare of the nodes in the
equilibrium of the two-player game with the aggregate welfare in the decentralized de-
fense game. Let D
∗
(g cA cD) denote the equilibrium payoff in the two-player game
on network g with cost of defense cD and cost of attack cA. Aggregate welfare in the
two-player game, starting from network g, and costs cA and cD, are defined as
W F(g cA cD)=D∗(g cA cD)
Aggregate welfare under defense profile  and attack X , of the n+1-player game starting
from network g, and given cost of defense cD, is defined as
W D(X;g cD)=
∑
i∈N
i(X;g cD)
Following Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999), we study the cost of decentraliza-
tion in terms of the price of anarchy (PoA): the ratio of welfare in the two-player game to
the welfare in the worst equilibrium of the decentralized defense game. Let E(g cA cD)
denote the set of equilibria of the n+ 1-player game on network g with cost of attack cA
and cost of defense cD. Let
PoA = max
gcAcD
(
W F(g cA cD)
min(X)∈E(gcAcD) W D(X();g cD)
)

Our analysis highlights externalities and points to sources of inefficiency in de-
centralized defense. The first source is the familiar one of positive externalities: an
individual’s protection decision creates benefits for other nodes, which she does not
take into account. Consider a star network and suppose that cost of attack is high,
cA > f(n)− f (n− 1), and cD ∈ (f (n)/n f (n)). In the equilibrium of the two-player game,
the aggregate welfare is f (n) − cD. However, in the equilibrium of the decentralized
game, the central player does not find it profitable to defend itself, as cD > f(n)/n. So
aggregate welfare in equilibrium of the n + 1-player game is 0. The ratio of the two is
unbounded for cD ∈ (f (n)/n f (n)).
Protection choices exhibit a threshold property: for a node to find it profitable to
protect it is necessary that other nodes belonging to the same minimal transversal pro-
tect. Thus protection decisions are strategic complements. This can generate coordina-
tion failures, resulting in large welfare losses. To see this, consider a tree with two hubs
each of which is linked to (n− 2)/2 distinct nodes. Suppose that
f (n)− f (n− 1) < cA < f
(
n
2
)
− (n− 2)f (1)
2
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Figure 8. Network with essential separators of size 2 having two minimal transversals: one of
size 1 and one of size 5.
so the adversary will only attack hub nodes. If 2f (n/2)/n < cD < f(n)/n, then the first
best outcome is to defend the two hubs. One hub protecting itself gives incentives
to the other hub to protect: two protected hubs is an equilibrium outcome. How-
ever, a hub node does not have unilateral incentives to protect: zero protection is also
an equilibrium outcome. In this equilibrium the aggregate payoffs are (n − 2)f (1) as
compared to first best outcome of f (n) − 2cD. The cost of decentralization can be
unbounded.
Third, at the local level, the game is clearly one of strategic substitutes. A node in
a separator has incentives to protect only if no other node in the separator protects it-
self. Like public good games on networks (cf. Bramoullé and Kranton 2007), the network
protection game therefore displays multiple equilibria. This can generate very large ef-
ficiency losses. As an example consider network g depicted in Figure 8.
Suppose that f (x) = x2, cA ∈ (2128), and cD < 11. Since the cost of attack is high,
the adversary will not remove a node without disconnecting the network. The set of
individually rational essential separators is a combination of sets as depicted in Figure 8.
Notice that the minimum transversal of E(g cA) is the node belonging to each of the
separators, while the largest minimal transversal consists of one distinct node from each
of the two element separators. Hence the modified PoA in this case is |E(g cA)| and as
the example in Figure 8 suggests, it is possible to have a graph g such that |E(g cA)| ≥
(n− 1)/2. Again, the cost of decentralization is unbounded.
The idea that personal security exhibits positive externalities is well known in the
economic epidemiology literature (and has been noted in the recent research in this
area; see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2013), Cerdeiro et al. (2014), Zawadowski (2013). More-
over, in the standard disease setting security choices are strategic substitutes. Our
model departs from this standard setting in two important ways: one, we have an in-
telligent adversary, and two, agents in our model care about the size of the compo-
nent (not just about survival). This means that security choices exhibit features of
both complements and substitutes. In addition due to the role of size effects, secu-
rity choices can exhibit large coordination failures. These features of the model distin-
guish it from the existing literature and call for new methods of analysis and yield fresh
insights.
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5. Concluding remarks
Infrastructure networks are a key feature of an economy. These networks face a variety
of threats ranging from natural disasters to intelligent attacks. This paper develops a
strategic model of defense and attack in networks.
We provide a characterization of equilibrium attack and defense in terms of two clas-
sical concepts in graph theory: separators and transversals. We show that the intensity of
conflict (the resources spent on attack and defense) and the possibility of active conflict
(when both adversary and defender target nodes for action) are both intimately related
to the architecture of the network. Finally, we show that the welfare costs of decentral-
ized defense can be very large.
We have assumed that the defender moves first and is followed by the attacker, and
that the defense is perfect: it would be more natural to allow for outcomes of conflict
to vary with resources of attack and defense allocated to a node. Appendix D presents
a preliminary analysis of models where we relax these assumptions. A general analysis
remains an important problem for future research.
Finally, we have assumed that payoffs depend only on the sizes of the networks (or
their components). In future work, it would be important to study a model where payoffs
depend on the details of the architecture of the components.
Appendix A: Proofs
We start with proving Proposition 1 that states generic equivalence of equilibrium out-
comes of the defender–adversary game in terms of payoffs, size of defense, and size of
attack. We start with the following auxiliary lemmata.
Lemma 2. Let g be a network over set of nodesN and let ⊆N be a set of defended nodes.
Generically, for any best responsesX∗ andX∗∗ to defense ,(g−X∗)=(g−X∗∗) and
|X∗| = |X∗∗|.
Proof. Let g be a network and let  be a defense, as stated in the lemma. Let X∗ and
X∗∗ be best responses to (g). Then we have
−(g−X∗)− |X∗|cD = −(g−X∗∗)− |X∗∗|cD
If |X∗| = |X∗∗|, then it follows that (g−X∗)=(g−X∗∗) and we are done. Otherwise,
the equality is equivalent to
cD = (g−X
∗)−(g−X∗∗)
|X∗∗| − |X∗| 
The set of values on the right-hand side of the equality is finite (there are at most
2n+1 − 1 values there). Hence the equality can be satisfied for a finite number of val-
ues of cD ∈ R++ and it is not satisfied for almost any value of cD ∈ R++. This completes
the proof. 
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Lemma 3. Let g be a network over the set of nodes N . Generically, for any two equilibria
(∗X∗) and (∗∗X∗∗), (g−X∗(∗))=(g−X∗∗(∗∗)) and |∗| = |∗∗|.
Proof. Let g, ∗, ∗∗, X∗, and X∗∗ be as stated in the lemma. Since ∗ is a best response
to X∗, so
(g−X∗(∗))− |∗|cD ≥(g−X∗(∗∗))− |∗∗|cD (3)
and since ∗∗ is a best response to X∗∗, so
(g−X∗∗(∗∗))− |∗∗|cD ≥(g−X∗∗(∗))− |∗|cD (4)
By Lemma 2, generically, (g−X∗∗(∗))=(g−X∗(∗)) (as both X∗∗(∗) and X∗(∗)
are best responses to ∗). This together with (3) and (4) implies
(g−X∗∗(∗∗))− |∗∗|cD ≥(g−X∗(∗))− |∗|cD
Similarly, by Lemma 2, generically, (g−X∗(∗))=(g−X∗∗(∗)). This together with
(3) and (4) implies
(g−X∗∗(∗∗))− |∗∗|cD =(g−X∗(∗))− |∗|cD (5)
If |∗| = |∗∗|, then (g − X∗(∗)) = (g − X∗∗(∗∗)) and we are done. Otherwise, (5)
can be rewritten as
cD = (g−X
∗(∗))−(g−X∗∗(∗∗))
|∗| − |∗∗| 
Since the number of values on the right-hand side is finite, for almost every value of cD ∈
R++ this equality is not satisfied. Hence, generically, |∗| = |∗∗| and (g − X∗(∗)) =
(g−X∗∗(∗∗)). 
Lemma 4. Let g be a network over set of nodes N and let XY ⊆ N be two attacks such
that |X| = |Y |. Generically,(g−X) =(g−Y).
Proof. Let g, X , and Y be as stated in the lemma. Suppose that (g−X)=(g−Y).
This equality can be rewritten as∑
C∈C(g−X)
f (|C|)=
∑
C∈C(g−Y)
f (|C|)
Since X = Y so there exists s > 0 such that g−X has a component of size s and g−Y has
not or g−Y has a component of such a size and g−X has not. Suppose that (g−X)=
(g−Y). Hence the equality above reduces to
f (s1)+ · · · + f (sp)= f (z1)+ · · · + f (zq) (6)
where s1     sp and z1     zq are sizes of components such that {s1     sp} ∩ {z1    
zq} = ∅. Equation (6) puts very strict constraints on function f and perturbing it
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slightly (within the set of functions satisfying Assumption 1) destroys the equality. Thus
(g−X)=(g−Y) for |X| = |Y | is a nongeneric property of f . 
With Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 in hand, we are ready to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Generic equivalence of defense size and of payoff to the de-
fender follow directly from Lemma 3. Consider equivalence of attack size and of payoff
to the adversary. By Lemmata 3 and 4, generically (g−X∗(∗))=(g−X∗∗(∗∗)) and
|X∗(∗)| = |X∗∗(∗∗)|. Thus the points follow as well. 
Proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 exploit some properties of graphs. The first
step is to establish these properties. Lemma 5 characterizes the essential separators as
those separators that are “thin”: every node of such separators is a neighbor of at least
two components of the residual network. Given a set of nodes X ⊆ N and a network
g over N , ∂g(X) = {k ∈ N \ X : there is j ∈ X such that jk ∈ g} is the neighborhood of X
in g. If X is a singleton, that is, X = {j}, then we will write ∂g(j) instead of ∂g({j}) (∂g(j)
is the set of neighbors of j in g). We will drop the subscript g in the notation if network g
is clear from the context.
Lemma 5. Let g ∈ G(N) be a network over a set of nodes N . A set X ⊆ N is an essential
separator if and only if X = ∅ and for every i ∈ X there exist two distinct components
C1C2 ∈ C(g−X), C1 = C2, such that ∂g−X(i)∩C1 =∅ and ∂g−X(i)∩C2 =∅.
Proof. Let g ∈ G(N) be a network over a set of nodes N and let X ⊆N .
The necessary part. Assume that X is an essential separator. Since X is a separa-
tor, so X = ∅. Assume, to the contrary, that there exists i ∈ X such that there is at
most one component C ∈ C(g − X) such that ∂g−X(i) ∩ C = ∅. Suppose first there is
no such component. Then the attack X ′ = X \ {i} results in the set of components
C(g − X ′) = C(g − X) ∪ {{i}}, larger than C(g − X), which contradicts the assumption
that X is essential. Second, suppose that there is exactly one component C ∈ C(g −X)
such that ∂g−X(i) ∩ C = ∅. Taking attack X ′, as before, leads to a residual network with
set of components C(g−X ′)= (C(g−X)\{C})∪{C∪{i}}, which has the same cardinality
as C(g−X). Therefore X is not essential, a contradiction.
Sufficiency part. Assume that X = ∅, and for every i ∈ X , there exist two distinct
components C1C2 ∈ C(g −X) such that C1 ∩ ∂g−X(i) = ∅ and C2 ∩ ∂g−X(i) = ∅. Then
there exist two nodes, j1 ∈ C1 ∩ ∂g−X(i) and j2 ∈ C2 ∩ ∂g−X(i), that are connected in g
and not connected in g − X . Hence X is a separator and we have to show that it is
essential. Suppose X ′  X , so there is some i such that i ∈ X but i /∈ X ′. Given the
definition of i ∈X it follows that |C(X ′)| ≤ |C(X)| − 1. Since X ′ was arbitrary, the claim
is established. 
We now develop a characterization of optimal attack strategies in terms of essential
(individually rational) separators and reducing attacks.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of the first part is by induction on the number of nodes in
X that violate the condition from Lemma 5. For the induction basis consider the set of all
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X ⊆N for which there are no nodes that violate the condition. Then, by Lemma 5, X is
essential and so the remainder is ∅ and E =X (in particular, it may be that E =X =∅).
The claim holds.
For the induction step, take any X ⊆ N for which there are exactly m nodes that
violate the condition from Lemma 5. Suppose that the claim holds for any Y ⊆ N for
which there are l < m nodes that violate the condition. Let i ∈X be a node that violates
the condition and let Y =X \ {i}. Since the condition is violated for i ∈X , so g−Y either
contains one component more than g − X (namely component {i}) or it has the same
number of components with one component C in g−X replaced with C ∪ {i} in g−Y .
Hence the condition is violated for l < m nodes from Y in g−Y . Thus, by the induction
hypothesis, Y can be decomposed into two disjoint sets E andR as claimed. Since, as we
argued above, adding i to Y does not increase the number of components in the residual
network, so R ∪ {i} does not contain a separator of g − E and so the decomposition of
X into E and R ∪ {i} satisfies the conditions from the claim. Thus points (i) and (ii) are
shown.
Now we show that if g is connected and X is a best response to some defense ⊆N ,
then either E =∅ or E ∈ E(g cA).
We show first, for any attack X and any decomposition of X into two disjoint sets E
and R satisfying points (i) and (ii), that
(g−E)−(g−X)≤(g)−(g−R) (7)
We use induction on R. For the induction basis, let R = ∅. Then (7) trivially holds.
For the induction step, suppose that (7) holds for any T  R. Take any i ∈ R, and let
T =R \ {i} and Y =X \ {i}. Let C ∈ C(g−Y) be the component with i ∈ C. Since R does
not contain an essential separator of g−X so C(g−X) and C(g−Y) differ at component
C only: either C \ {i} ∈ C(g−X) or C \ {i} =∅. Hence
(g−X)=(g−Y)− (f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)) (8)
Now let C ′ ∈ C(g−T) be the component with i ∈ C ′. Applying attack {i} to g−T replaces
C ′ with components C ′1    C
′
m such that
⋃m
i=1C ′i = C ′ \ {i}. Hence
(g−R)=(g− T)−
(
f (|C ′|)−
m∑
i=1
f (|C ′i|)
)
≤(g− T)− (f (|C ′|)− f (|C ′| − 1))
(9)
(by the fact that f is strictly convex). By the induction hypothesis,
(g−E)−(g−Y)+ (f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1))
≤(g)−(g− T)+ (f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1))
and, by the fact that C ⊆ C ′ and by convexity of f ,
(g−E)−(g−Y)− (f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1))
≤(g)−(g− T)+ (f (|C ′|)− f (|C ′| − 1))
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Thus, by (8) and (9),
(g−E)−(g−X)≤(g)−(g−R)
This shows the induction step. Hence we have shown (7).
Now, let  ⊆ N be a defense chosen in the first stage and suppose that X is a best
response to . Whereas X is a better response to  than R, so
−(g−X)− cA|X| ≥ −(g−R)− cA|R|
and, consequently,
(g−R)≥(g−X)+ cA(|X| − |R|)=(g−X)+ cA|E|
From (7), we have
(g−X)≥(g−E)+(g−R)−(g)
Putting the last two inequalities together, we arrive at
(g−R)≥(g−E)+(g−R)−(g)+ cA|E|
Simplifying this yields
−(g−E)− cA|E| ≥ −(g)
In other words, E ∈ E(g cA). 
The proof of part (ii) of Proposition 2 now follows from the lemmata above and the
arguments in the main text. We turn next to proving part (i) of Proposition 2.
To simplify some parts of the argument, we will make a tie-breaking assumption on
the behavior of the adversary. It says that if two strategies yield equal payoffs to the
adversary, then he will choose the strategy that yields a lower payoff to the defender.
Assumption 2. Given a network g and defense , if two strategies X ⊆ N and X ′ ⊆ N
yield the same payoff to the adversary, then he chooses the strategy that results in a resid-
ual network of lower value.
The first step here is to state and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let g ∈ G(N) be a connected network over N , and let cD and cA be the costs
of defense and attack, respectively. Suppose that  ⊆ N is an equilibrium defense and
X ⊆ N is a best response to it. Suppose that there exists i ∈  such that D(E(g cA)) =
D( \ {i}E(g cA)). LetX ′ ⊆N be a best response to ′ =  \ {i}.
Then there exists a component C ∈ C(g − X) such that C ⊆  and either C = {i} or
C \ {i} ∈ C(g−X ′). Moreover,
D(X;g)=D(′X ′;g)+ f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)− cD (10)
and
cA ≤ f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1) (11)
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Proof. Let ⊆N be a defense, i ∈  and ′ =  \ {i}. Let X be a best response to  and
let X ′ be a best response to ′.
Since X is a best response to , so X ∩  = ∅ and (g − (X \ )) = (g − X), and
analogously with X ′ and ′. We prove the lemma in the seven steps below.
(i) We have (g−X) >(g−X ′). Since  is an equilibrium strategy of the defender,
so D(X;g)≥D(′X ′;g), that is, (g−X)−cD|| ≥(g−X ′)−cD(||−1). Hence
(g−X)>(g−X ′).
(ii) We have i ∈ X ′. Assume, to the contrary, that i /∈ X ′. Then X ′ ∩  = X ′ ∩ ′ = ∅.
Similarly, since X ∩  = ∅, so X ∩ ′ = ∅. Hence A(′X ′;g) = A(X ′;g) and
A(′X;g) = A(X;g). By the fact that A(′X ′;g) ≥ A(′X;g), as X ′ is a
best response to ′, this yields A(X ′;g) ≥ A(X;g). Additionally, by point (i),
(g − X) > (g − X ′), so X ′ results in a residual network of lower value than in the
case of X . Hence, by the tie-breaking Assumption 2, X ′ is an equilibrium response to ,
a contradiction. Thus it must be that i ∈X ′.
(iii) Let Y ⊆ N be an attack with i ∈ Y and such that Y ∩ ′ = ∅. Then either {i} ∪
∂g(i)⊆ Y or there exists exactly one C ∈ C(g−Y) such that i ∈ ∂g(C).
Take any decomposition E ∪ R of Y , as described in Lemma 1. It cannot be that
i ∈ E, as otherwise we would have E ∈ D(E(g cA)), while E /∈ D(′E(g cA)), as Y ∩
′ = ∅, and we would have a contradiction with the assumption that D(E(g cA)) =
D(′E(g cA)). Hence i ∈ R and there exists a component C˜ ∈ C(g −E) such that i ∈ C˜.
Let C = C˜ \R be what remains of C˜ after the remainder R of Y is applied to g−E. By the
definition of the remainder, R does not contain a separator for g − E. Therefore either
C = ∅ (i.e., it is completely removed by R) or C ∈ C(g − Y) (i.e., it is a component in
g − Y ). Suppose that C = ∅, that is, C ⊆ R. Then ∂g−E(i) ⊆ R and ∂g(i) ⊆ E ∪ R = Y .
Since i ∈ Y , so {i} ∪ ∂g(i) ⊆ Y . Suppose now that C is a component in C(g − Y). We
will show that i ∈ ∂g−E(C). Assume the opposite. Then ∂g−E(C) must be a separator in
g − E, as it separates C from a component containing i. But then ∂g−E(C) contains an
essential separator for g−E. Since ∂g−E(C)⊆R, this contradicts the assumption that R
is a remainder and does not contain any essential separators of g−E. Hence it must be
that i ∈ ∂g−E(C) and, consequently, i ∈ ∂g(C).
(iv) For all C ′ ∈ C(g −X ′) with i ∈ ∂g(C ′), C ′ ⊆ . Assume the opposite. Then there
exists C ′ ∈ C(g−X ′) with i ∈ ∂g(C ′) (and consequently i /∈ C ′) such that i′ ∈ C ′ \ . Con-
sider a strategy X ′′ = (X ′ \ {i})∪ {i′}. Since X ′ ∩′ =∅ and i′ /∈ , so X ′′ ∩′ =∅. Notice
that (g −X ′′) ≤ (g −X ′), as both the residual networks agree at all the components
apart from what remains of C ′ ∪ {i} after i′ is removed (at the least it is one component
of the same size as C ′). Since |X ′| = |X ′′| so A(′X ′′;g)≥A(′X ′;g) and so X ′′ is a
best response to ′. But then we get a contradiction with point (ii), as i /∈ X ′′. Hence it
must be that C ′ ⊆ .
(v) There exists C ′ ∈ C(g−X ′)∪ {∅} such that C = C ′ ∪ {i} ∈ C(g−X) and C ⊆ . Let
C ′ =∅ if {i} ∪ ∂g(i)⊆X ′ or let C ′ be the unique C ′ ∈ C(g−X ′) with i ∈ ∂g(C ′), otherwise.
By point (iii) such C ′ exists. By point (iv) and by the fact that i ∈ , C ⊆ . Thus there
exists a component C ′′ ∈ C(g−X) such that C ⊆ C ′′. Suppose that C  C ′′. We will show
that in this case X ∪ {i} is a better response to ′ than X ′, a contradiction.
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Notice that since X ∩=∅ and ′ =  \ {i} so (X ∪ {i})∩′ =∅. By point (iii) either
{i}∪∂g(i)⊆X ∪{i} or there exists exactly one component C ′′′ ∈ C(g− (X ∪{i})) such that
i ∈ ∂g(C ′′′). Hence C ′′ = C ′′′ ∪ {i} and C ′′ must be unique in C(g−X) with i ∈ ∂g(C ′′). The
residual network g− (X ∪ {i}) differs from g−X at one component only: instead of C ′′
it has C ′′ \ {i}. Thus the value of residual network g− (X ∪ {i}) is

(
g− (X ∪ {i}))=(g−X)− (f (|C ′′|)− f (|C ′′| − 1)) (12)
Similarly, since either C ′ =∅ or i ∈ ∂g(C ′), so the residual network when using X ′ \ {i}
against ′, g − (X ′ \ {i}), differs from g −X ′ by one component: it has C instead of C ′.
Additionally, since = ′ ∪ {i} and X ′ ∩′ =∅ so X ′ \ {i} =X ′ \. Thus the value of the
residual network g− (X ′ \ {i}) can be written as

(
g− (X ′ \ {i}))=(g−X ′)+ f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1) (13)
Since X is a best response to , it is not worse than X ′ \ {i}. Hence
−(g−X)− cA|X| ≥ −
(
g− (X ′ \ {i}))− cA(|X ′| − 1)
This, together with (13), implies
(g−X)≤(g−X ′)+ f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)− cA(|X| − |X ′| + 1) (14)
Similarly, since X ′ is a best response to ′, it is not worse than X ∪ {i}. Hence
−(g−X ′)− cA|X ′| ≥ −
(
g− (X ∪ {i}))− cA(|X| + 1)
This, together with (12), implies
(g−X)≥(g−X ′)+ (f (|C ′′|)− f (|C ′′| − 1))− cA(|X| − |X ′| + 1) (15)
From (14) and (15) we get
f (|C ′′|)− f (|C ′′| − 1)− (f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1))
≤ cA(|X| + 1)− cA|X| −
(
cA|X ′| − cA(|X ′| − 1)
)= 0
If C  C ′′, then |C| < |C ′′|, and, by strict convexity of f , the left-hand side is greater
than 0, a contradiction. Thus it must be that C ′′ = C.
(vi) We have D(X;g)=D(′X ′;g)+ f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)− cD. Since X is a best
response to , it is not worse than X ′ \ {i}. Hence
−(g−X)− cA|X| ≥ −
(
g− (X ′ \ {i}))− cA(|X ′| − 1)
Adding f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1) to both sides we get
−((g−X)− (f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)))− cA|X|
≥ −((g− (X ′ \ {i}))− (f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)))− cA(|X ′| − 1) (16)
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As we observed in the proof of point (v) ((12) and (13) and the fact that C ′′ = C),

(
g− (X ∪ {i})) = (g−X)− (f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)) (17)
(g−X ′) = (g− (X ′ \ {i}))− (f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)) (18)
Hence, from (16), we get
−(g− (X ∪ {i}))− cA(|X| + 1)≥ −(g−X ′)− cA|X ′|
Alternatively, since X ′ is a best response to ′, so
−(g− (X ∪ {i}))− cA(|X| + 1)≤ −(g−X ′)− cA|X ′|
Combining these two inequalities we get
−(g− (X ∪ {i}))− cA(|X| + 1)= −(g−X ′)− cA|X ′| (19)
Since X ′ is the equilibrium response to ′, by tie-breaking Assumption 2,
(g−X ′)≤(g− (X ∪ {i}))
Additionally this, together with (17) and (18), implies

(
g− (X ′ \ {i}))≤(g−X) (20)
From (19), (17), and (18) we get
−(g−X)− cA|X| = −
(
g− (X ′ \ {i}))− cA(|X ′| − 1)
Again, since X is the equilibrium response to , by tie-breaking Assumption 2,
(g−X)≤(g− (X ′ \ {i}))
and, by (17), (18), and (20),
(g−X) = (g− (X ′ \ {i}))

(
g− (X ∪ {i})) = (g−X ′)
Thus both X and X ′ \ {i} are best responses to  and both X ′ and X ∪ {i} are best re-
sponses to ′. This, together with (18), implies
D(X;g)=D(′X ′;g)+ f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)− cD
(vii) We have cA ≤ f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1). Since X ′ is a better response to ′ than X ′ \ {i},
so
−(g−X ′)− cA|X ′| ≥ −
(
g− (X ′ \ {i}))− cA(|X ′| − 1)
and, consequently,
cA ≤
(
g− (X ′ \ {i}))−(g−X ′)
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By (17),
cA ≤ f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1) 
Proof of part (i) of Proposition 2. Characterization of the optimal strategies of the
adversary follows directly from Lemma 1. Thus in what follows we concentrate on the
equilibrium defense.
Let  be an equilibrium defense. We will show first that if  N , then  must be a
minimal transversal of D(E(g cA)).
Assume the opposite. Then there exists i ∈  such that D( \ {i}E(g cA)) =
D(E(g cA)). Let X be the equilibrium response to  and let X ′ be the equilibrium
response to ′ =  \ {i}. Clearly X ∩=∅ and X ′ ∩′ =∅.
Recall that C(g − X ′) is the set of components in the residual network when the
strategies ′ and X ′ are used by the players, and C(g−X) is the set of components in the
residual network when  and X are used. By the assumption that N , both these sets
are nonempty. We will show that either ′ or ′′ (described below) is a better strategy
for the defender than , which will contradict the assumption that  is an equilibrium
strategy.
Let C ∈ C(g − X) be a component such that C ⊆  and either C = {i} or C \ {i} ∈
C(g−X ′). By Lemma 6 such C exists.
Since for all j ∈ ∂g(C), D(E(g cA))D( ∪ {j}E(g cA)), any such j belongs to an
essential separator not covered by . Take any j ∈ ∂g(C) and let {C1    Cm} ⊆ C(g−X)
be all the components in g−X such that j ∈ ∂g(Cl) for all l ∈ {1    m} (assume, without
loss of generality, that C1 = C; notice that in particular it may be that m = 1 and the
argument below works for that case as well). Consider defenses ′ =  \ {i} and ′′ =
 ∪ {j} ∪⋃ml=2Cl. We will show that either ′ or ′′ is a better strategy for the defender
than .
Let X ′′ be the equilibrium response of the adversary to ′′ and let C ′′ = {j} ∪⋃ml=1Cl.
We show first that C ′′ ∈ C(g − X ′′). Since ′′ protects C ′′, there is component C ′′′ ∈
C(g − X ′′) such that C ′′ ⊆ C ′′′. Suppose that C ′′  C ′′′. Then there exists v ∈ C ′′′ such
that v /∈ C ′′. We will show that v /∈ ′′. If v ∈ ∂g(Cl) for some l ∈ {1    m}, then it can-
not be that v ∈  (because these components are separated by X used as an equilib-
rium response to ). Thus the only possibility is that v ∈ ∂g({j}). But then v would
be one of the components Cl created by applying X to g and, consequently, it would
be v ∈ C ′′, a contradiction with the assumption that v /∈ C ′′. Since v /∈  and v /∈ C ′′,
then v /∈ ′′. Now consider a response X ′′ ∪ {v} to ′′. At the very least it removes
a node from component C ′′′ (it may additionally disconnect the component). Hence
(g− (X ′′ ∪ {v}))≤(g−X ′′)− f (|C ′′′|)+ f (|C ′′′| − 1). Alternatively, by Lemma 6, (11),
cA ≤ f (|C|) − f (|C| − 1) < f(|C ′′′| − f (|C ′′′| − 1)) (by convexity of f and |C ′′′| ≥ |C| + 1).
Thus it follows that
−(g− (X ′′ ∪ {v}))− cA(|X ′′| + 1) >−(g−X ′′)− cA|X ′′|
which contradicts the assumption that X ′′ is a best response to ′′. Therefore it must be
C ′′′ = C ′′.
360 Dziubin´ski and Goyal Theoretical Economics 12 (2017)
As we have shown above, C ′′ = {j} ∪⋃ml=1Cl ∈ C(g − X ′′). After attack X ′′ ∪ {j} is
applied to g, component C ′′ is replaced with components C1    Cm. Hence
(g−X ′′)=(g− (X ′′ ∪ {j}))+ f(1+ m∑
l=1
|Cl|
)
−
(
m∑
l=1
f (|Cl|)
)
 (21)
Alternatively, since C is a component in g−X , every node in ∂g(C) is removed by X .
Thus, when nodes in  ∪ {j} ∪⋃ml=2Cl are defended, the residual network g − (X \ {j})
differs from g−X by having component C ′′ instead of components C1    Cm. Hence

(
g− (X \ {j}))=(g−X)+ f(1+ m∑
l=1
|Cl|
)
−
(
m∑
l=1
f (|Cl|)
)
 (22)
Since X ′′ is a better response to ′′ than X \ {j},
−(g−X ′′)− cA|X ′′| ≥ −
(
g− (X \ {j}))− cA(|X| − 1) (23)
and (g −X ′′) ≤ (g − (X \ {j})) in the case of equality (notice that (X \ {j}) ∩ ′′ = ∅
as X ∩Cl =∅ for all l ∈ {1    m} and X ∩=∅).
Equations (21), (22), and (23) imply
−(g− (X ′′ ∪ {j}))− cA|X ′′| ≥ −(g−X)− cA(|X| − 1)
Subtracting cA from both sides we get
−(g− (X ′′ ∪ {j}))− cA(|X ′′| + 1)≥ −(g−X)− cA|X| (24)
Alternatively, since X is a best response to  than is X ′′ ∪ {j}, we have
−(g−X)− cA|X| ≥ −
(
g− (X ′′ ∪ {j}))− cA(|X ′′| + 1) (25)
and (g−X)≤(g− (X ′′ ∪ {j})), in the case of equality.
By (24) and (25), X ′′ ∪{j} is a best response to  as well, and since X is an equilibrium
response to , it must be that (g − X) ≤ (g − (X ′′ ∪ {j})). Combining this with (21)
we get
(g−X ′′)≥(g−X)+ f
(
1+
m∑
l=1
|Cl|
)
−
(
m∑
l=1
f (|Cl|)
)
 (26)
From (10) and (26) it follows that
D(X;g)=D(′X ′;g)+ f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1)− cD
D(′′X ′′;g)≥D(X;g)+ f
(
1+
m∑
l=1
|Cl|
)
−
(
m∑
l=1
f (|Cl|)
)
− cD
Since  is a better strategy than ′, then f (|C|)− f (|C| − 1) ≥ cD. Alternatively, since 
is a better strategy than ′′, then cD ≥ f (1+∑ml=1 |Cl|)− (∑ml=1 f (|Cl|)). Hence f (|C|)−
f (|C| − 1)≥ f (1+∑ml=1 |Cl|)− (∑ml=1 f (|Cl|)), which contradicts strict convexity of f .
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Thus we have shown that   N , and then  must be a minimal transversal of
D(E(g cA)). 
Proof of Proposition 3. The nonmonotonicities have been established in the text.
Here we establish monotonicity of the defender’s payoff in cost of attack and mono-
tonicity of the adversary’s payoff in cost of defense.
We start with monotonicity of payoff to the defender in cost of attack. The argu-
ment here is straightforward in the generic case, where equilibrium payoffs are unique:
suppose (∗X∗) is an equilibrium with network g and costs (cA cD). Let c′A > cA. If
the defender retains defense strategy ∗, it must be the case that the attack strategy will
be weakly smaller under high cost c′A. This in turn implies that the defender’s payoff
must be weakly larger if he maintains the original strategy ∗. So, in equilibrium under
(c′A cD), he must also do better. However, the monotonicity holds for any values of the
parameters. The problem here is the nonuniqueness of equilibrium payoffs. However,
this is not a concern, because if this was the case, the more costly attacks would cease
being equally good for the adversary as the less costly ones. The precise argument is as
follows. Let cA and c′A be the costs of attack such that c′A > cA. Let (∗X∗) be an equi-
librium under cA and let (∗∗X∗∗) be an equilibrium under c′A. Since X∗(∗) is a best
response to ∗ under cA, it is not worse than X∗∗(∗); hence
−(g−X∗(∗))− cA|X∗(∗)| ≥ −(g−X∗∗(∗))− cA|X∗∗(∗)|
which yields
(g−X∗(∗))−(g−X∗∗(∗))≤ cA
(|X∗∗(∗)| − |X∗(∗)|) (27)
Similarly, since X∗∗(∗) is a best response to ∗ under c′A, it is not worse than X∗(∗).
This yields
(g−X∗(∗))−(g−X∗∗(∗))≥ c′A
(|X∗∗(∗)| − |X∗(∗)|) (28)
Equations (27) and (28) imply cA(|X∗∗(∗)| − |X∗(∗)|) ≥ c′A(|X∗∗(∗)| − |X∗(∗)|). By
c′A > cA it follows that
|X∗∗(∗)| ≤ |X∗(∗)| (29)
Now assume to the contrary that
D(∗X∗(∗);g cD) > D(∗∗X∗∗(∗∗);g cD)
Since ∗∗ is an equilibrium defense under c′A,
D(∗∗X∗∗(∗∗);g cD)≥D(∗X∗∗(∗);g cD)
The two equations above imply
D(∗X∗(∗);g cD) > D(∗X∗∗(∗);g cD)
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that is,
(g−X∗(∗))− cD|∗|>(g−X∗∗(∗))− cD|∗|
and, consequently,
(g−X∗(∗))−(g−X∗∗(∗)) > 0 (30)
Equations (27) and (30) imply cA(|X∗∗(∗)| − |X∗(∗)|) > 0. By cA > 0, it follows that
|X∗∗(∗)| > |X∗(∗)|, a contradiction with (29). Thus it must be that D(∗X∗(∗);
g cD)≤D(∗∗X∗∗(∗∗);g cD). Notice that this argument holds for any parameters of
the model, not only in the generic case.
We now turn to the monotonicity of payoff to the adversary in cost of defense. Let cD
and c′D be the costs of defense such that c′D > cD. Let (∗X∗) be an equilibrium under
cD and let (∗∗X∗∗) be an equilibrium under c′D. Since X∗(∗) is a best response to ∗
and X∗∗(∗) is a best response to ∗ in the adversary’s subgame,
−(g−X∗(∗))− |X∗(∗)|cA = −(g−X∗∗(∗))− |X∗∗(∗)|cA
Thus another equilibrium under cD is (∗X ′), where X ′ equals X∗ at all defense
profiles but ∗, where it is equal to ∗∗. By Lemma 3, generically, (g − X∗(∗)) =
(g − X∗∗(∗)). By analogous arguments, (g − X∗∗(∗∗)) = (g − X∗(∗∗)). Since
∗ is an equilibrium defense under cD and ∗∗ is an equilibrium defense under c′D,
(g−X∗(∗))− |∗|cD ≥ (g−X∗(∗∗))− |∗∗|cD
(g−X∗∗(∗∗))− |∗∗|c′D ≥ (g−X∗∗(∗))− |∗|c′D
which can be rewritten as
(g−X∗(∗∗))−(g−X∗(∗)) ≤ (|∗∗| − |∗|)cD
(g−X∗∗(∗∗))−(g−X∗∗(∗)) ≥ (|∗∗| − |∗|)c′D
Since c′D > cD, these inequalities imply
(g−X∗∗(∗∗))−(g−X∗∗(∗)) > (g−X∗(∗∗))−(g−X∗(∗))
This, combined with (g − X∗(∗)) = (g − X∗∗(∗)) and (g − X∗∗(∗∗)) =
(g − X∗(∗∗)), leads to contradiction. Hence it must be that the payoff to the ad-
versary increases when the cost of defense increases. Notice that this argument holds
for generic values of the parameters of the model. There are nongeneric examples where
the payoff to the adversary decreases when the cost of defense increases. 
Before proving Proposition 4, we need the following auxiliary lemma, stating a useful
property of a convex function.
Lemma 7. Let f : R→R be a strictly convex and differentiable function. Then function
g(x y)= yf (x)− xf(y)
x− y
is strictly increasing in both arguments as long as x > y.
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Proof. To show the result we compute partial derivatives of h:
gx(x y) =
(
y
x− y
)(
f ′(x)− f (x)− f (y)
x− y
)
gy(x y) =
(
x
x− y
)(
f (x)− f (y)
x− y − f
′(y)
)

By strict convexity of f , f ′(y) < (f (x) − f (y))/(x − y) < f ′(x) as long as x > y; hence
gxgy > 0 and g is strictly increasing in x and in y. This completes the proof. 
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4. Point (i) follows directly and we omit the proof. For point
(ii) observe, from Proposition 2, that with cA ∈ (f (n − 1) f (n) − (n − 1)f (1)) and g ∈
E(g cA)= 0, the optimal attack targets no nodes. So the optimal defense also consists of
defending no nodes. Thus the costs of conflict are 0.
For point (iii), assume that cA ∈ (f (m − 1)f (m)) with m ∈ {1     n − 1}. With
such a cost of attack, on any connected network, the adversary best responds to any
incomplete defense by removing at least one node. Therefore the lower bound for the
costs of conflict are min(cA ncD) in this case.
Part 1. Suppose that cD > c(nm). We show first that in every equilibrium on hmn
the defender chooses the empty defense and the adversary responds to it with attack {1}
(the separator of hmn ). By Proposition 2, an equilibrium defense must be either empty,
or complete, or equal to {1}. Moreover, the best response of the adversary to the empty
defense either contains {1}, in which case the reducing attack part of it must be empty
(because components of hmn −{1} have sizes at most m), or does not contain {1}, in which
case it must be a reducing attack leaving a residual network consisting of a single com-
ponent of size m. It is easy to check that the former is the best response to the empty
defense and the latter is the best response to defense {1}. Hence empty defense is better
than {1}. The payoff to the defender from using the empty defense is
D(∅ {1};hmn  cD)=(hmn − {1})=
⌊
n− 1
m
⌋
f (m)+ f ((n− 1) mod m)
With cost of defense cD > c(mn), the payoff to the defender from the complete defense,
D(N∅;hmn  cD)= f (n)− ncD
is lower than the payoff from the empty defense. Hence on the equilibrium path the
defender chooses ∅ and the adversary responds with {1}.
Second, we show that for the ranges of costs in question, ncD > cA. Since cD >
c(nm),
ncD > f(n)−
⌊
n− 1
m
⌋
f (m)− f ((n− 1) mod m)
The right-hand side of this inequality can be rewritten as
f (n)− n− 1− (n− 1) mod m
m
f(m)− f ((n− 1) mod m)
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Since f is strictly convex and (n − 1) mod m < m, then ((n − 1) mod m)f(m) >
mf((n− 1) mod n). Therefore,
cD > f(n)−
(
n− 1
m
)
f (m)
The right-hand side can be rewritten as
f (n)−
(
n− 1
m
)
f (m)=
n−1∑
j=m
f(j)− (n−m− 1)
(
f (m)
m
)
= f(m)+
n−1∑
j=m+1
(
f(j)− f (m)
m
)

By convexity of f , for all j > m, f(j) > f(m)/m. Thus ncD > f(m) and, since cA ∈
(f (m− 1)f (m)), ncD > cA. Hence the minimal costs of conflict are cA.
Part 2. Suppose that cD < c(nm). We will show that with such a cost of defense, in
any equilibrium on a connected network the defender chooses the complete defense.
Notice that with cD < c(nm), on any connected network g, any defense  of size || ≤
m is worse for the defender than the complete defense. This is because the residual
network after the adversary best responding to consists of components of sizes at most
m and the upper bound on the value of such residual networks is (n − 1)/mf (m) +
f ((n− 1) mod m) (this upper bound is attained by hmn ). With cD < c(nm) the defender
prefers complete defense to .
Consider defense  of size d = || such that m< d < n. Let X be a best response to .
The payoff to the defender from  and X is
D(X;g cD)=(g−X)− dcD
≤ f (d)+
⌊
n− d − 1
m
⌋
+ f ((n− d − 1) mod m)− dcD
The upper bound on the value of the residual network above comes from the following
observation. With cA ∈ (f (m− 1)f (m)), in any best response the adversary removes
unprotected nodes from any component of size greater than m. Therefore in the best
case the adversary removes one node and the only component of size greater than m
in the residual network is a fully protected component of size d (by convexity of f it is
better to have one fully protected component of size d than several fully protected and
smaller ones summing up to d). Thus if
cD <
f(n)− f (d)− ⌊n−d−1m ⌋− f ((n− d − 1) mod m)
n− d 
then the complete defense is better to  for the defender. We will show that c(nm)
is lower than the right-hand side of the inequality above, which will imply that for the
costs of defense under consideration, the complete defense is better for the defender.
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The inequality
c(nm)= f (n)−
⌊
n−1
m
⌋− f ((n− 1) mod m)
n
<
f(n)− f (d)− ⌊n−d−1m ⌋− f ((n− d − 1) mod m)
n− d
can be rewritten as
df(n)− nf(d)−
(
n− d
m
)
(r1f (m)−mf(r1))+
(
n
m
)
(r2f (m)−mf(r2)) > 0
where r1 = (n−1) mod m and r2 = (n−d−1) mod m.9 Since r2 <m and f is convex, then
r2f (m)−mf(r2) > 0, and to show that the inequality above holds it suffices to show that
df(n)− nf(d)−
(
n− d
m
)
(r1f (m)−mf(r1)) > 0 (31)
Since d < n and f is convex, df(n)− nf(d) > 0. Moreover, by Lemma 7,
df(n)− nf(d)
n− d >
r1f (m)−mf(r1)
m− r1
(as n > d >m> r1). Hence
df(n)− nf(d)
n− d −
(
m− r1
m
)(
r1f (m)−mf(r1)
m− r1
)
> 0
which implies (31), by multiplying both sides by (n−d). Hence any equilibrium defense
is complete and the costs of conflict are ncD. 
Example of no conflict networks
Even if the marginals of f do not grow very rapidly, there may exist networks (other than
complete network) that do not feature active conflict. Take f (x)= x2, for example. Con-
sider a family of core–periphery networks, {cpk}k∈N. Given k ∈ N, network cpk has 2k
nodes: a fully connected core of k nodes, and a periphery of k nodes. Each core node is
connected to exactly one, unique, periphery node (cf. Figure 9).
When the cost of attack is high, cA > 4m − 1, then it is easy to verify that in equi-
librium the defender will either defend all the core nodes or use an empty defense.
When the cost of attack is low, cA < 4m − 1, then, again, there are two types of equi-
librium defense: either no node is defended or all nodes are defended. It is easy to
verify that three types of defense would be candidates for equilibrium defense here:
empty defense, complete defense, and defense with all core nodes protected. To rule
out the last one, suppose that 2(2m− k)− 1≤ cA < 2(2m− k)+ 1, where 1≤ k≤m− 1.
9Recall that for integer x and y , x/y = (x− x mod y)/y .
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Figure 9. Core–periphery networks cp2, cp4, and cp6.
Figure 10. Network that allows for active conflict (under f (x)= x2).
With such a cost of attack, the adversary would remove a single node from a com-
ponent of size greater than 2m − k and would not remove single nodes from a com-
ponent of size 2m − k or less. Thus, when all the core nodes are protected, the ad-
versary removes k spokes. When no node is protected, the adversary removes k core
nodes. Since defending only the core nodes is better than defending all the nodes,
mcD ≥ (2m)2 − (2m − k)2. Alternatively, protecting all the core nodes is better than no
protection, so mcD ≤ (2m−k)2 − (2m−2k)2 −k. The two inequalities imply 2k2 −k≤ 0,
a contradiction for k≥ 1.
Notice, in the example above, that if each core node was connected to a higher num-
ber of periphery nodes, active conflict would be possible (as illustrated by Example 1).
With more periphery nodes per core node (and with suitable costs of defense and at-
tack), protecting the separators may create enough value for such a defense to be attrac-
tive. Increasing the value of the residual network requires defending all the nodes, which
is too high an investment and too low a gain to be profitable. This illustrates one reason
for the possibility of active conflict in the model: blocking all the individually rational
essential separators may secure a high value of the residual network at a relatively low
cost, while increasing the value further may require a much higher cost.
To get more insight into why active conflict is possible, despite the convexity of f and
the linearity of costs, consider the network in Figure 10. Figure 11 illustrates function
∗(m;g cA) under different ranges of costs of attack. The dotted line is an upper convex
hull of that function. The optimal size of defense is at a point of that hull adjacent to a
line with slope cD. In the case of low cost of attack, if the convex hull contains any points
of ∗(m;g cA) for 0 <m< n, then active conflict is possible for some suitable range of
costs of defense. In the case of high cost of attack, active conflict is possible if the convex
hull contains any points of ∗(m;g cA) for 0<m< τ(E(g cA)).
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Figure 11. Optimal defenses of different sizes for network in Figure 10.
In Figure 11, low cost of attack is cA < 9 and cA > 9 is high cost of attack. Active
conflict is possible for cA ∈ (59). When cA ∈ (57) and cD ∈ (3754), then the unique
equilibrium defense is ∗ = {b}, and the best response to it in the adversary’s subgame
is X∗(∗)= {a}. When cA ∈ (79) and cD ∈ (59), then the unique equilibrium defense is
∗ = {ab} and removing any unprotected node is a best response to it in the adversary’s
subgame. When cA ∈ (915), τ(E(g cA)) = 2 and there is no equilibrium outcome with
active conflict.
Proof of Proposition 5. For point (i), suppose that cD > f(n)/n. We will show that in
this case the equilibrium defense  = ∅. Assume, to the contrary, that  = ∅ and let X
be the equilibrium response to . Pick any i ∈  and let C(i) be the component of i in
the residual network g−X . The payoff to i is
i(X;g cD)= f (|C(i)|)|C(i)| − cD
By the fact that f is strictly increasing and strictly convex, f (x)/x is increasing. Hence
i(X;g cD)≤ f (n)/n− cD < 0. Thus i is better off by not protecting, a contradiction
to the assumption that  is an equilibrium defense. Hence it must be that =∅.
For point (ii), suppose that cD < f(n)/n. Assume that cA < f(n)− f (n− 1). We will
show that  = N is an equilibrium defense. Assume otherwise. Then there exists i ∈ 
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Figure 12. Separators and other centrality measures.
that is better off by deviating and choosing no protection. Since cA < f(n) − f (n − 1),
the best response to  \ {i} is X = {i}, and so the deviating node gets removed, obtaining
payoff 0 instead of f (n)/n− cD ≥ 0. Hence i is not better off by deviating and so =N is
an equilibrium defense. This proves point (a).
Assume that cA > f(n)− f (n− 1). Let  be minimal transversal of E(g cA). We will
show that  is an equilibrium defense. By Lemma 1, the best response to  is the empty
attack X =∅. Assume, to the contrary, that  is not an equilibrium defense. Then there
exists i ∈  that is better off by choosing no protection instead of protection. Since  is a
minimal transversal, it must be that there exists an essential separator E ∈ E(g cA) such
that  \ {i} ∩ E = ∅. Moreover, any such separator contains i. Since any such separa-
tor is better than the empty attack, the adversary responds to  \ {i} with one of these
separators, removing i. But then i gets payoff 0 instead of f (n)/n − cD ≥ 0. Hence it is
not better of by deviating, a contradiction. Therefore  must be an equilibrium defense.
This proves point (b).
Since the adversary’s subgame remains as in the centralized defense game, an equi-
librium response X∗ is as described in Proposition 2. 
Appendix B: Key players and centrality
Essential separators and their transversals determine the key nodes in our study of at-
tack and defense. These key groups of nodes give rise to new notions of centrality dis-
tinct from other notions such as closeness, betweenness, or eigenvector centralities. To
see how these notions are different, consider the network in Figure 12 (for simplicity the
example is based on individual, rather than group, notions of centrality). Assume that
the network value is based on function f (x) = x2 and suppose that the cost of attack is
cA ∈ (2589), so that the adversary attacks only the nodes that separate the network and
so that removing node 2 is better than not attacking at all. Suppose also that cD ∈ (089),
so that defending node 2 constitutes an optimal defense as well. However, this node
is less central than node 1 in the sense of degree, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector,
Bonacich, and intercentrality measures.10 The numerical values for these centralities
10Following Ballester et al. (2006), we define for a parameter α ∈ R, b(gα) =M(gα)1, where M(gα) =
(I−αG)−1, I is the identity matrix, andG is the adjacency matrix of the network. We require α to be relatively
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Centrality Node 1 Node 2
Degree 9 5
Closeness 0684 0619
Betweenness 425 375
Eigenvector 05765 03036
Bonacich, high 5322 28118
Bonacich, medium 24311 18208
Bonacich, low 1093 10519
Intercentrality, high 29409 28632
Intercentrality, medium 52438 31263
Intercentrality, low 11936 11061
Table 1. Centralities of nodes 1 and 2 in the network from Figure 12.
Figure 13. Separators and transversals in interlinked stars (n= 12).
are summarized in Table 1. For Bonacich centrality, we consider three values of the pa-
rameters: high (α= 0237), intermediate (α= 01), and low (α= 001).
Appendix C: Separators and transversals in families of networks
Interlinked stars
Interlinked stars are networks with two disjoint nonempty sets of nodes: the set of cen-
ters C and the set ofperiphery nodes P . The centers are fully connected, forming a clique.
Each of the periphery nodes is connected to all the centers. Interlinked stars have one
essential separator: the set of all the centers, E(g)= {C}. All minimal transversals of E(g)
are singleton sets consisting of one central node. The essential separator and a minimal
transversal for an interlinked star are illustrated in Figure 13.
small so thatM(gα) is well defined and nonnegative. The intercentrality measure we consider, also defined
in that paper, is ci(gα)= bi(gα)2/Mii(gα). We define closeness as cli(g)= (n− 1)/∑j =i d(i j;g), where
d(i j;g) is the length of the shortest path between i and j in g.
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Figure 14. Separators and transversals in complete bipartite networks (n= 12).
Figure 15. Separators and transversals in trees (n= 12).
Complete bipartite networks
In a complete bipartite network the set of nodes, N , can be partitioned into two disjoint
sets, N1 and N2, N1 ∩ N2 = ∅, such that the set of links is the set of all possible links
connecting nodes from N1 and nodes from N2. There are two essential separators in
these networks, E(g) = {N1N2}. Every transversal consists of one node from N1 and
one node from N2. Minimal essential separators and transversals for complete bipartite
networks are illustrated in Figure 14.
Trees
In any tree network, every nonempty set of internal nodes (nodes that are not leaves)
constitutes a separator. Essential separators are sets of internal nodes such that no two
of them are neighbors. Transversals of essential separators are subsets of internal nodes.
In particular, there is a unique transversal of the set of all essential separators: the set of
all internal nodes. Minimal essential separators and transversal for tree networks are
illustrated in Figure 15.
Core–periphery networks
Nodes are divided in two disjoint sets: the core and the periphery. Each node of the
periphery is connected to exactly one node of the core, while the nodes of the core are
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Figure 16. Separators and transversals in core–periphery networks (n= 12).
connected with periphery nodes and the core constitutes a clique. Essential separators
are subsets of the core. There is a unique transversal: the set of all core nodes. Mini-
mal essential separators and transversals for core–periphery networks are illustrated in
Figure 16.
Appendix D: Order of moves and nature of conflict
This section explores the role of sequential choice and perfect defense.
Simultaneous moves
Consider a variant of the model studied in the paper where the players make their choice
simultaneously. In this case the set of strategies of the defender remains unchanged.
A pure strategy of the adversary is now a set of nodes, X ⊆ N , chosen to attack. It is
important to note that the timing of moves does not affect Lemma 1, which remains
unchanged. Suppose that the cost of attack is high. Any strategy, X , in the support
of the equilibrium strategy of the adversary must be an individually rational essential
separator, i.e., X ∈ E(g cA). Similarly, any strategy, , in the support of the equilibrium
strategy of the defender must be a minimum transversal of the set of essential separators
it blocks, D(E(g cA)), in E(g cA).
The second observation is that, depending on the network, the players may use pure
or mixed strategies in equilibrium. This is a departure from our existing results, where
equilibrium always exists in pure strategies. But note that the use of mixed strategies is
sensitive to the network. In particular, if the network is such that one unit of defense is
sufficient to block all the individually rational essential separators of the adversary, then
in equilibrium both players use pure strategies and equilibrium outcomes are the same
as in the sequential model studied in the paper. When τ(E(g cA)) > 1, the defender may
choose to block more individually rational essential separators by mixing across several
transversals.
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The model of conflict
We have assumed perfect defense. A more natural way to proceed would be to suppose
that the number of resources assigned by each player to a node determines the proba-
bility of winning/losing the node. Following Tullock (1980), suppose that the probability
of successfully attacking the node is given by a contest success function (CSF)
π(ad)=
{
0 if a= 0
dγ
aγ+dγ otherwise
where γ ∈ R+, and a and d are resources assigned by the adversary and defender, re-
spectively. The probability of successfully defending the node is π(da)= 1−π(ad).11
A strategy of the defender is a vector d ∈ NN such that di is the number of defense
resources assigned to node i. A strategy of the adversary is a function X : NN →NN such
that, given vector of defense allocation d, it maps to a vector of attack allocation a =
X(d) such that ai is the number of attack resources assigned to node i. We will call the
set of nodes that receive a positive number of defense resources the defended nodes and
the set of nodes that receive a positive number of attack resources the attacked nodes.
Given defense and attack allocations, (da), the probability that set M ⊆ N of nodes is
won by the adversary and removed from g is
w(M|ad)=
∏
j∈M
π(ajdj)
The expected payoffs to the defender and the adversary from defense and attack alloca-
tions, (ad), are
A(ad|g cA) = −
∑
M⊆N
w(M|ad)(1−w(N \M|ad))(g−M)− cA
∑
j∈N
ai
D(ad|g cD) =
∑
M⊆N
w(M|ad)(1−w(N \M|ad))(g−M)− cD
∑
j∈N
di
Lemma 1 still obtains. The set of attacked nodes can be decomposed into an essen-
tial separator and a reducing attack. In what follows we restrict attention to high costs
of attack and we focus on the benchmark model of linear contests: γ = 1. The main
point we wish to make is that with Tullock contests, optimal defense will extend beyond
minimal transversals and may cover multiple nodes in the same separator.
Consider an interlinked star with two core nodes: 1, 2, and n − 2 periphery nodes
(n ≥ 4). Suppose that the cost of attack is high, cA > f(n − 1). The unique essential
separator of g is the set of core nodes, {12}. Let a1, a2 be the amount of resources as-
signed by the adversary to the two core nodes and let d1, d2 be the defense resources
assigned by the defender to the two core nodes. Expected payoff to the adversary from
11The perfect defense model studied in the paper can be seen as a limiting case of the general contest
model: the probability of successful attack is given by αaγ/(δdγ + αaγ) with α= 1 and δ→ +∞.
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assignment (a1 a2 d1 d2) is
A(da|g cA)= −π(a1 d2)π(a2 d2)(n− 2)f (1)
− (π(a1 d1)+π(d2 a2)− 2π(d1 a1)π(a2 d2))f (n− 1)
− (1−π(a1 d1)−π(d2 a2)+π(d1 a1)π(a2 d2))f (n)
− cA(a1 + a2)
= −f (n)+π(a1 d1)π(a2 d2)V1(n)
+ (π(a1 d1)+π(a2 d2)−π(a1 d1)π(a2 d2))V2(n)
− cA(a1 + a2)
where V1(n) = f (n − 1) − (n − 2)f (1) and V2(n) = f (n) − f (n − 1). Notice that V2(n) is
the gain from removing the first node of the core, and V1(n) is the gain from removing
the second node of the core. Since the cost of attack is high, V2(n) < cA. Hence if V1(n)≤
V2(n), then it is not profitable for the adversary to attack, and both players assign no
resources to the nodes in equilibrium. Consider now the more interesting case where
V1(n) > V2(n).
The expected payoff to the defender is
D(da|g cA)= f (n)−π(a1 d1)π(a2 d2)V1(n)
− (π(a1 d1)+π(a2 d2)−π(a1 d1)π(a2 d2))V2(n)
− cD(d1 + d2)
The defender chooses (d1 d2) to maximize his expected payoff subject to the con-
straints that d1 d2 ≥ 0 and that the adversary chooses (a1 a2) to maximize his expected
payoff subject to a1 a2 ≥ 0.
It is simpler to begin with the case where the defender is given 2d ≥ 0 defense re-
sources and the adversary is given 2a ≥ 0 attack resources. This turns the optimiza-
tion problem above into a zero-sum bilevel optimization problem, where the defender
chooses an allocation of 2d to maximize
π(a1 d1)π(a2 d2)V1(n)+ (π(a1 d1)+π(a2 d2)−π(a1 d1)π(a2 d2))V2(n)
It is possible to show that the partition (dd) is a maximizer of both π(a1 d1)π(a2
d2)V1(n) and (π(a1 d1) + π(a2 d2) − π(a1 d1)π(a2 d2))V2(n), and hence of the whole
expression above. In response the adversary chooses the partition (aa). Thus (dd)
and (aa) are the equilibrium defense and the attack strategies as well.
When both players distribute their resources evenly, the payoff to the adversary is
A(da|g cA)= −f (n)+π(ad)2V1(n)+ (2π(ad)−π(ad)2)V2(n)− 2cAa
If d ≥ V2(n)/cA, it is not profitable for the adversary to attack. Thus with sufficiently
low ratio cD/cA, the defender distributes his resources evenly and the adversary does not
attack. Otherwise both players compete, choosing optimal levels of attack and defense
resources and distributing them evenly.
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